Sizing up China’s African Footprint

The Teyie Report | Sliding through the slick mud or bumping along the dusty lanes that run parallel to half-built roads from Kenya to Ghana and from Zimbabwe to Sudan, the sight of the Chinese foreman in a wide-brimmed straw hat with the seemingly ubiquitous cigarette hanging from his lips is an increasingly familiar one...READ MORE

Is China Killing Africa’s wildlife?

There has been an upsurge in poaching and we associate this with the Chinese. We fear that the presence of Chinese in the country [Kenya]is causing an increase in ivory smuggling...Basically destroying Africa's wildlife READ MORE

Exit Musharraf: A Score for Democracy.

The announcement by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that he would resign “for the sake of the nation” should be a lesson for African leaders who to cling to power despite ouster via the ballot box. Musharaf’s exit marks an important milestone in global democracy. The people will always prevail.

Earlier this month, Mauritania joined the long list of African countries whose failed leadership has led to coups. On 6th August, Mauritania’s General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz ousted democratically-elected president Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and declared himself president. Abdel Aziz has since promised to hold elections “soon” and to fight corruption which he says was rampant in the previous regime.

Like the self declared Mauritanian president Abdel Aziz, Pervez Musharraf ascended to power by the gun. He forcefully seized power in 1999 and has ruled Pakistan ever since. He gained some form of international recognition after the 9/11 attack in the U.S. as a key ally in the fight against international terrorism.

Musharaf began to fall out of favor both at home and abroad in 2007 following complains by Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai of purported regrouping of Taliban forces in western Pakistani mountains where Osama Bin Laden is believed to be hiding.

Last December’s assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto reignited animosity against Musharaf by locals blaming him for not providing sufficient security. His party lost the elections that soon followed.

Like all global leaders, Musharaf made many unpopular decisions during his tenure. However, he chose to “put the people of Pakistan first.” In a televised address, he said that he was satisfied with whatever he had done for his country (including the military coup in 1999) and that he hoped justice would prevail following his resignation. “I put myself to the people of Pakistan to decide about my future and they will do justice,” he said.

Considering how he came to power, Musharaf could have chosen the African route by silencing any opposition and declaring a state of emergency. He chose to step down. Yes he may have caved into political pressure to resign, but he had other available options which he gracefully disregarded. He did not do a Mugabe or the recent happenings in Mauritania.

Everything he did as Pakistani president will determine his future as a civilian since he shed his military coat. The people of Pakistan wanted him out. He has obliged and so should other African leaders who have fallen out of favour with the electorate.

when is a coup d’etat not a coup?

by: Austin Ejiet (Daily Monitor)

During the 1960s and 1970s, hardly a month went by without a spectacular and almost always grisly unconstitutional change of government somewhere in Africa.

The cold war had reached its zenith, with the ideological power blocks jostling for supremacy and global domination. Perceived to be exceptionally vulnerable to communist seduction, Africa in particular, was under constant surveillance.

Without the benefit of prior colonial influence, the Soviet bloc was quick to pounce on some African despots mouthing half-cooked Marxist slogans, persuading the good man to allow them open military bases in exchange for military hardware.

The West on the other hand was loathe to see its spheres of influence, nurtured for over a century as colonies, protectorates or “overseas dominions,’ sliding to the other side. The slightest hint of intransigence was dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly.

The demise of the Cold War and the failure of Communism to take root in a serious manner anywhere in Africa eased the stranglehold and spelt the end of military coups.

Unconstitutional changes of governments continued, of course, but via civil wars, rebellions and self-styled liberation struggles. That phase, too, is beginning to fade away. These bush wars, some of them lasting as long as 30 years, are costly in terms of lives - military as well as civilian – and in terms of wasteful expenditure and the wanton destruction of valuable infrastructure.

So Africa has had to move on. The new type of coup is characterised by massive rigging of the elections by whoever happens to be in control as the incumbent.

In the rare case that the competitors successfully mobilise against electoral theft, the modern African potentate either arm-twists the electoral commission to release fraudulent results , or, failing that, simply refuses to concede defeat, declares himself victor and gets himself sworn in for a fresh term.

But Africans have had enough of these charades. The electoral thief will, of course, send out his crack troops to smash a few skulls with police batons.

In the event of that not working , the president will order his troops to shoot to kill. When even that fails to quell popular outrage, the president will invite his, “defeated” opponent to discus how to share power. It is a coup d’etat, elaborate perhaps, but a coup nevertheless, more bloody and more frightening than its ancestor of the 60s and 70s.

That is the route that Kenya and Zimbabwe have chosen to pursue, though in the case of the latter, it is not yet a done deal. Which is perhaps why the military chiefs in the Republic of Mauritania have reverted back to the old – fashioned and swifter way.

President Sidi Cheikh Ould Abdallah was elected to the presidency of Mauritania 15 months ago, ending decades of military rule. Ten days ago, he was shown the exist when he committed the unpardonable folly of dismissing some of the army chiefs.

Hasn’t this man heard of ex- president Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa of Uganda? Doesn’t he know the elementary axiom that you don’t touch the military when you have no military bastion of your own?

The Generals have also accused him of failing to rein in the skyrocketing food prices. Moreover, the fallen president is said to have exhibited unacceptable levels of corruption by allowing his wife to loot the state.

He is also said to have given his daughter a position of power not commensurate with first daughters. Perhaps he also promoted his son to the rank of Lt. Colonel, but I can’t testify to the veracity of this assertion.

So, why have the African Union (AU), the European Union and the US government refused to recognise the new rulers? Why is everybody threatening to withdraw financial support?

Why were Mwai Kibaki and Robert Mugabe allowed to attend the AU summits in Ethiopia and Cairo after the two had clearly carried out coups d’etat in their respective countries? When is a coup not a coup?

Austin Ejiet can be reached at ejieta@yahoo.com

Keen on business, China is yet to flex its formidable military muscle in Africa

by PATRICK MUTAHI (Daily Nation)


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Related Post: Read the Sarah Palin/Joe Biden US vice presidential debate transcript HERE
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A 489-foot Chinese freighter An Yue Jian docked at the port of Durban in South Africa last month with three million rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 3,000 mortar rounds and 1,500 rocket- propelled grenades destined for landlocked Zimbabwe.
However, the ship instantly drew controversy with dockworkers refusing to unload the cargo. Zambia, which chairs the Southern African Development Community (SADC) grouping, also urged other regional states to bar the vessel from entering their waters. It was rightly feared the arms could deepen Zimbabwe’s election crisis and be used in a crackdown on the opposition.

Under immense local and international pressure, the ship was recalled to China.

Even though the heat has cooled down, it puts to question whether Beijing is in a position to protect its vast investments in Africa.

Tellingly, Sino-Africa trade has significantly increased from $11 billion (Sh660 billion) in 2000 to $65.9 billion (Sh4 trillion) in 2007, making it the continent’s third largest trade partner behind the United States and France. It is projected that by 2010, China will overtake the US and France as Africa’s biggest trading partner with a target of $100 billion (Sh7 trillion) trade surplus.

Thus, Beijing has swiftly become the most aggressive investor in Africa, rattling the West which has dominated Africa’s virgin markets. But this has also exposed the Asian giant to various security challenges.

In April 2007, nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopian oil engineers were killed during an assault on an oil exploration site operated by Sinopec’s Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

The militia group Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) also kidnapped seven Chinese men who it later released. The ONLF has repeatedly warned foreign oil companies to leave the Ethiopian region over which it has gone to war with Somalia.

In February 2007, four assailants raided a Chinese building materials plant in Kenya and killed one Chinese employee. In April 2006, the militant Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) condemned China for taking a $2.2 billion stake in oil fields in delta. It detonated a car bomb and warned that Chinese investors would be “treated as thieves.”

Anti-Chinese sentiment has increased in Zambia since 2005, when an explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine killed at least 46 workers and spawned complaints of unsafe working conditions and poor environmental practices. In 2004, rebels abducted Chinese workers in southern Sudan.

Despite the mounting insecurity to its investments, China is not building a military base in Africa. Rather, it is stepping up its ability to pursue a more confident and independent security policy in the continent by resorting to collective security policy with African countries.

Beijing’s game plan, it would appear, is to neutralise threats in Africa with its diplomatic charm. Consequently, as Beijing prepares to become Africa’s most prominent economic partner, its capability to respond to insecurity, though it has the capacity to do so, isn’t evident in the continent.

Un-manned combat aircraft

According to the US Defense Department Annual report released in May 2007, China is modernising its military in ways that give it options for launching surprise attacks on targets far from its borders.

The report cites the Army’s acquisition of long-endurance submarines, un-manned combat aircraft, additional precision-guided air-to-ground missiles and long-distance military communications systems.

“The People’s Liberation Army is pursuing a comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries,” the Pentagon report said.

Referring to a January 2007 test in which China shot down one of its own satellites with a missile, the report said the nation’s capability “poses dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all space-faring nations.”

But Beijing’s military build-up is not exceptional. Most external powers, for which Africa’s mineral wealth has become indispensable to their growth, have backed up their economic forays with a projection of military might. This is aimed at suppressing local resistance in their dominions or fending off their realms from other imperialist competitors.

Between 2000 and 2006, the US increased the number of its troops in Africa from 220 to nearly 1,000. This was alongside the establishment of the controversial New Africa Command (AFRICOM), announced when Chinese President Hu Jintao was completing a tour of the region in 2006.

The new military structure signifies Africa’s emerging strategic importance in the superpower’s economic and security calculus in order to contain terrorism and secure global oil wealth. At the same time, AFRICOM is viewed as a vehicle to counter the Chinese juggernaut in Africa.

This has raised eyebrows in Chinese academia. Lin Zhiyuan, the deputy director of the Academy of Military Sciences commented that “AFRICOM will surely facilitate coordinating or overseeing US military actions in African for an effective control of the whole of Africa.”

India is also expanding its military wings and its naval dominance in the strategic maritime shipping lanes around Africa. This has made Chinese security analysts worry about the safety of their supplies.

India currently imports 11 per cent of its oil from Africa (mostly Nigeria), but is seeking more, especially from Angola, leading in some cases to direct competition with China.

It is also searching for secure, long-term uranium supplies to feed its nuclear reactors, as well as other strategic minerals, meaning that South Africa is emerging as a key partner.

India is involved in a tripartite alliance with Brazil and South Africa under the IBSA Dialogue Forum. This is an effective co-operative approach to build a bridge between Asia and Africa. The alliance was set when the leaders of three regional goliaths, India’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Brazil’s Lula Da Silva, and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki introduced a new approach to south-south cooperation at the 2003 UN General Assembly, resulting in a trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa agreement.
IBSA has amplified its presence through numerous joint ventures. More importantly, India views the IBSA Free Trade Agreement with Brazil and South Africa as a “distinct possibility” of enhancing trade relationship with these countries. In addition, the defence ministers of the troika agreed in Pretoria on February 1, 2004 to hold joint military exercises and train their personnel.

India is also using the forum to enhance its maritime cooperation in order to boost regional security. Notably, both Delhi and Pretoria have long coastlines and maritime interests.

On the economic front, India has 2.2 million square kilometres of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), while South Africa’s EEZ is a million square kilometres.

Around 90 per cent of exports of both the countries are shipped. In addition, South Africa has six well-developed ports and a sound maritime infrastructure, with good facilities for ship repair and potential to get involved in shipbuilding.

Due to this strategic interest and maritime bond, in March 2006 India signed an agreement with South Africa to improve cooperation in merchant shipping and other related activities. The agreement provides for facilitating Indian companies to establish joint ventures in the field of maritime transportation, and ship building and repairs. Furthermore, the pact will also facilitate the exchange of information for accelerating the flow of commercial goods at sea and at port and encourage the strengthening of cooperation between merchant fleets.

India’s military presence

Along the East African coast India has signed defense agreements with Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique. It has also initiated joint training programmes with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. Delhi has convinced island states such as Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles to cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering.

Moreover, its fleet in the Indian Ocean is turning into one of the most powerful naval forces of the region, including new state-of the-art aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines.

This build up by the World’s largest democracy is multi-pronged: Economically for market and resources; politically for international influence and support for possible permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and competing with China for influence in Africa.

However, Delhi appears to be lagging behind Beijing in the trade stakes. Indo-African trade climbed to $30bn (Sh1.8 trillion) in 2007, but Sino-African trade was near $66bn (Sh4 trillion).

Despite the fact that all major powers have been deploying naval vessels to combat piracy or to keep the maritime supply lines in the waters surrounding Africa open, the Chinese Navy has kept its flag down.

It has no military bases in Africa like the United States, UK or France. Likewise, Beijing does not train African soldiers to deal with hostility perceived by Beijing as a threat to its national interests.

In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Gabon, Beijing has dispatched military teams to assist in the maintenance of equipment, rather than providing training for specific warfare activities. In Zambia and Algeria, the collaboration is limited to medical aid. Nevertheless, the People’s Republic is constantly facing the need to protect its citizens and companies abroad.

The long-term risk is that local tensions and conflicts will entice external powers to interfere and to exploit this volatility to gain clout at the expense of the Chinese. In response to such scenarios, China has opted to work with host governments.

“China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unhampered and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange,” China’s 2006 Africa Policy stated.

Chinese bilateral military exchanges with other armed forces expanded significantly with 174 high-level visits in 2001 to over 210 in 2006. However, the increasing trend was not maintained in Africa, where such two-pronged exchanges have remained stable at an annual average of 26.

Beijing has established a permanent military dialogue only with South Africa. In addition, according to Jonathan Holslag a Researcher on China-Africa Affairs, “the number of Chinese military attachés and their support staff has barely or not expanded at all in the last few years. In fact, only in 15 countries are Chinese military attachés dispatched on a permanent basis.”

In terms of military aid, there is no evidence that China’s military aid aims at counterbalancing other powers, such as the United States. Apart from Sudan and Zimbabwe, most countries to have received Chinese aid in the last few years are also supplied by Washington. Moreover, in 2007 Beijing temporarily froze the supply of heavy arms to Khartoum after pressure from the Western countries.

On the other hand, Beijing has instructed its embassies in Africa to keep a close watch on local security. In Sudan and Kenya, state-owned companies receive protection from local security forces. Beijing has also signed an agreement with South Africa to prevent the Chinese there from turning into a target for armed gangs.

The swift and successful evacuation of Chinese citizens recently from Chad demonstrated that it has developed operational scenarios to deal with emergencies.

Such measures might help Chinese citizens and companies to evade some of the risks, but they do not offer any guarantee for safeguarding its economic activities if the situation keeps deteriorating. This also does not tackle Beijing’s uneasiness with the military presence of other countries.

Instead of using a military presence to counter-balance other major powers, the People’s Republic joins collective security efforts within the framework of the UN and African regional organisations. Over the past few years this has evolved from passive support to active cooperation.

During the cold war, Beijing supported anti-Western groups. In 1971 when it assumed membership of the UN Security Council, China opposed all peacekeeping operations in Africa. After the Cold War, this position was replaced with a more moderate approach.

China viewed Africa’s conflicts as a result of structural violence, and hence had to be resolved in the same way. Consequently, China has supported UN peace keeping missions on the basis of a well defined and restricted mandate of maintaining sovereignty.

Non controversial peacekeeping operations - Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone all got its green light.

When the Security Council decided to dispatch troops in Liberia in 2003, China even offered to contribute to this mission, and from then on it gradually increased the number of blue helmets to 1,800 in 2007.

China’s financial support to peacekeeping by the UN but also by regional organisations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States has also increased significantly.

However, China kept off any missions that were seen as infringing on the host country’s sovereignty. It opposed the European- supported Operation Turquoise in Rwanda; when Washington gave up its impartiality and called for broadened mandate of UNSOM and when France demanded an increase of the troop levels of the UN operation in Ivory Coast in 2004. Beijing did not veto these interventions, but abstained and kept aloof of the implementation.

In 2006, Beijing successfully appealed to the Sudanese Government to allow a combined force of UN and AU peace keeping force into Darfur. Historically, this marked the first time in China’s 35 years at UN Security Council that it has implored a sovereign country to accept the UN peace keeping force.

While a future need cannot be ruled for China to have a military base in Africa, currently it is playing safe by projecting itself as a partner. Evidently, it is well aware that putting up such a facility might reduce its diplomatic options and attract resistance in Africa, just as Washington is experiencing now, and raise suspicion everywhere.

Yet, as interests, perceptions and capacities are susceptible to change, it remains to be seen whether China will stay on this track of cooperative security.

(Patrick Mutahi heads a team of Researchers at Eastern and Horn of Africa Programme, Africa Policy Institute (Nairobi). Africa Insight is an initiative of the Nation Media Group’s Africa Media Network Project.)

Africa: The Next Frontier for Investment!

By Don McKinnon, Commonwealth Secretary-General
How many times have you heard speeches beginning with such words, “The trouble with Africa…”? Not only does that give a starting point to any negative conversation, but it is based on assumptions that are factually wrong. It also implies that Africa is the same.

Those who make sweeping generalisations don’t talk of Africa’s rich cultures; its status as the cradle of humankind – the successful examples of democracy and governance, or the dynamic economies.

Yes, there is disease, lack of education, human rights concerns, and increasing climatic insecurity. But these are not unique to the countries in Africa. There is no more reason to lump all Africans into one category than there is to do so about the people in any other continent or country or even city.

Ignorance breeds ignorance and loss of opportunity. My success and that of others like me, in turning public perceptions is the foundation for business and investment success. Bad news always overshadows good news about Africa in the West, where negatives perpetuate their own myth about the continent.

People look at Africa and see tensions between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. They see money disappearing into Swiss bank accounts (and incidentally, corruption has both a demand and supply side – money wouldn’t disappear in the way it does offshore unless there were those at the other end willing to take it), rather than staying on the continent. Nearly 40% of the money generated in Africa leaves it which compares with something like 90% of earnings in East Asia which stay there.

The fact that Africa still attracts less than 2% of world trade is scandalous – but I again point out that there is a demand and supply factor in this: Africa can supply but its options are limited if the demand conditions are distorted by trade barriers.

The journey that is ‘democracy’ goes on, and the Commonwealth walks alongside – mediating tensions, building electoral commissions, helping to introduce new voting systems, even drafting new Constitutions in places like Swaziland. It might be two or three or four steps forward and one back – but overall it’s forward.

The economic situation looks good, too, even if much of it is driven by the resource needs of China and India. Much of Africa’s wealth lies in the ground – and now, they are starting to benefit this continent. Look at places like Nigeria, Botswana, and Ghana. Look at China, and Russia, and India, and Brazil, wanting to invest in Africa. Remittances now come back to Africa to the tune of $8 billion a year. In the last five years, sub-Saharan economies have routinely grown at nearly 7% per annum. Well over $50 billion-worth of debt has been cleared and there has been exponential growth in the numbers of listed companies.

Many good things have happened unnoticed in Africa in the last decade.The positive lies in what former IMF Head Michel Camdessus called the ‘silent revolution’ – the macroeconomic stabilization which has taken place in Africa, alongside a rise in commodity prices. Budget deficits and inflation rates have been cut; debt has been better managed, and in many cases canceled. Countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana have massively improved their investment climate.

How can non-Africans and African alike, help consolidate the gains, and turn around some of those persistent negative perceptions? Let me give a very brief answer – in terms of politics and economics.

2005 was supposed to be the year of Africa: the Gleneagles G8 Summit, the Commission for Africa, and more. In essence, it revolved around a deal: non-African countries – especially the G8 – would re-commit: with more and ‘better’ aid, more debt relief, and a trade deal that allowed African countries to trade as equals, and indeed gave them the time and technical support to become ‘equals.’

Almost three years on, the G8 has met some but not all of its promises. Its aid money is pledged but not totally forthcoming. The Doha Round still has its wheels spinning with little traction, to the eternal shame of those who have had it good for so long: the US and the EU especially. The EU is still seen to be imposing a raw deal on its African, Caribbean and Pacific partners in the Economic Partnership Agreements. They are supposed to open up new opportunities for all and give ACP countries a lift, not just new markets for Europeans.

Meanwhile, Africa has shown how serious it is about its own future in its own hands. The strengthened AU, a lively NEPAD, and the sometimes painful work of the African Peer Review Mechanism are indicators. I’m pleased, by the way, that 27 African countries have now signed up to that self-monitoring APRM – with its focus on political governance, economic governance, corporate governance, and socio-economic development.

Africa is rich in natural resources. It’s in the middle of a technological revolution. Its future can be rosy, if it continues to take ownership of its future. It begs the question which President Museveni of Uganda asked his fellow Commonwealth Heads of Government, when they met in Kampala last year. How, he asked, can we breed African, not just Asian, tigers? The Commonwealth argument is that Africa’s path to transformation and development requires greater inclusiveness and fundamental democratic principles.

A market analyst might look at Democracy in 2008, weigh up its potential returns, management and business risk, and conclude that it is volatile stock. Others might even conclude that it is overvalued for the return on the investment. Yet it remains our greatest aspiration. It remains the blue-chip magnet which draws people – just look at levels of migration towards the most established democracies.

Economic development, too, is best when it’s democratic and inclusive. Hence the need to promote all business activity – small and large, and that accommodates women and youth entrepreneurs. Hence, too, the need for responsible business – accountable socially and environmentally as well as financially. The clearest indication of a society’s commitment to itself is that its citizens invest their hard-earned cash in the country itself, and don’t take their money beyond its borders to keep it ‘safe’. People should have the confidence to live, work, save and invest in their own countries.

I point to Mo Ibrahim, whose life’s work and money is now dedicated to promoting governance in Africa. Many of you will know that the first Mo Ibrahim Award went to Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique. Mozambique is a Commonwealth country which faces many challenges, but it is meeting them. In 15 years, levels of poverty have been cut by a third, and the numbers of children in school have been doubled. That’s what I mean by Africa’s upward trajectory of progress and hope.

My message is quite simple: don’t judge the whole continent by the negative few; look at the parts one by one; think about their history and the challenges others have created for those who live there before criticising the situation today; and develop meaningful long term partnerships.